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• Separation Kernel and PP Description
• High Robustness PP Issues
– Least Privilege
– Dynamic Reconfiguration




• Need for U.S. Government Protection Profile 
for Separation Kernels in Environments 
Requiring High Robustness  (SKPP)
– Various products forthcoming
– High Robustness - uncharted Common Criteria 
territory
• Preliminary Analysis: Protection Profile (PP)
requires
– CC-oriented description of TOE abstractions
– Extensions to several Common Criteria requirements 
– Extrapolation from existing guidance and examples
• E.g., US scheme medium robustness CIM 
• Medium Robustness MLS OS PP draft
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General Separation Kernel Characteristics
• Separation Kernel (Rushby, 1981, etc.)
• Manages computing and communication resources
– Self-protecting
• Creates abstractions of resources for export at SK 
interface
• SK Partitions resources into policy equivalence classes*
• Controlled separation of equivalence classes
– No interaction between classes unless explicitly allowed
* These equivalence classes are sometimes also called “partitions”
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General SK Characteristics
• Taxonomy of SK runtime resources
– Internal
• Used for implementation of kernel
– Exported
• Subjects
– Programs, asynchronous devices, etc.
• All other 




• Limited functionality expected
– E.g., embedded systems 
• No runtime user interface
– No user identification and authentication 
• Static runtime configuration of security policy and resource 
allocation
– Specified in “TSF configuration data”
– Exceptions allowed for exigencies 
• Support privileged subjects
– Limit access to privileged interfaces
• Support trusted delivery, trusted recovery 
• Export or store audit records  











– Delivery and recovery mechanisms
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SKPP High Robustness Issues 
• Principle of least privilege (PoLP)
– All-or-nothing security cannot be high robustness
• Dynamic configuration
– On-the-fly security policy changes may be intractable to 
analyze with respect to the separation of equivalence 
classes (e.g., Harrison et al, 1976)
• Hardware as part of the TSF 
– A classic third-party assurance composition problem
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Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP) 
• PoLP (reviewed in Saltzer, Schroeder, 
1975)
– Mechanisms should have no more privilege 
than what is necessary to perform the actions 
for which they were designed
• PoLP Applied to SKPP
– TSF must have capability to restrict subjects’…
• access to privileged operations
• access to resources within a partition
– TSF must be structured to restrict privileges of 
internal modules/functions
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Least Privilege in FDP_ACC
• Use Case:
– TSF supports multiple heterogeneous subjects in a 
partition
– TSF must discern between those subjects for the 
purpose of information flow control
• FDP_ACC:
– TSF may allow an operation of a subject on an exported 
resource only if:
• Partition-to-Partition flow rule explicitly authorizes operation
• Subject-to-Resource flow rule explicitly authorizes operation
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Least Privilege in ADV_ARC/ADV_INT
• PoLP advantages for design and internal structure 
– Affords simplicity to implementation
– Coupled with layering and minimization, increases 
confidence in analysis of TSF correctness
• ADV_ARC: requires justification that TSF design 
achieves PoLP
• ADV_INT: requires PoLP to be applied to all TSF 
modules/functions
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Exceptions to PoLP 
• FDP_ACC allows certain PoLP “exceptions”
– Configurations where subject-resource interaction is 
“policy-equivalent” to that of their partition 
• Interaction between single-subject and single-resource 
partitions
– Only one subject in subject’s partition
– Only one exported resource in resource’s partition
• Homogeneous functionality of subjects in a partition
– All subjects in subject’s partition require same 




• Static Configuration SK
– Initial configuration data determines runtime behavior
• All resource allocations 
– Time - e.g., CPU time slices
– Space - e.g., per-partition memory regions
• All allowed information flows  
– Ideal for embedded systems and security research
• Simple design and implementation 
• Evaluatable size
– Provides fundamental security service: separation
– Building block for more complex systems
– Assurance issue with configuration-data based policy 
mechanism:




• Problem scenario 
– Failure of a peripheral device in a mission critical 
application, or
– Overriding environmental security conditions
• Desirable for TOE to be able to change its 
configuration
• SKPP allows TOE to change resource allocations 




• Continuity of security across a policy transition
– Undefined security during transition?
– Undefined combinations of policies after transition?
• Arbitrary changes are hard to understand w.r.t. 
policy
– Formal models often have static attributes because of 
this
• Approach: 
– Limit how policy may change
– Four hierarchical modes of change defined
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SKPP Dynamic Configuration Options
1. Off-line transitions and pre-loaded configurations
– Allows complete removal of previous security state 
– Allows pre-analysis of subsequent security policies
– Triggered by privileged subject or offline actions
– Assurance issue:   TSF must ensure
• Only authorized subject may request configuration change
• TOE fully and properly executes the change request
2. On-line transitions and pre-loaded, configurations
– Allows dynamic change of configuration
– Additional assurance issue:  TSF must continuously maintain 
secure state
• Before, during and after the configuration change
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SKPP Dynamic Configuration Options 
(continued)
3. On-line transitions and limited configuration changes
– Changes limited by static rules enforced by TSF
– Additional assurance issue:
• Ensure ad hoc policy change requests are consistent with 
organization’s policy intents
4. On-line transitions and arbitrary configuration changes
– Additional assurance issue:
• TOE vendor must provide convincing definition of “secure 
transition” in SFP model
• Options 3 and 4 are beyond the scope of the SKPP
– Will require an ST- rather than PP-based evaluation
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SKPP DC Requirements
Details of SKPP functional and assurance 
requirements for dynamic configuration are 
ST-specific
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SKPP Transition to CC V3.0
• SKPP 
– Developed to be conformant to CC V2.2
• CC V3.0 significantly different
• FDP_ACC simpler than FDP_IFF/IFC 
• Challenges include
– Hardware assurance undefined
– Non-user Security Attributes
– Covert Channel Analysis by developer
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Security Attributes Binding
• SKPP requires binding of security attributes 
to exported resource when resource is 
created
• Two-step process:  registration and 
initialization
– FIA_URE: TSF must store attributes of exported 
resources in identified internal resources
• e.g., kernel structures
– FIA_ISA: TSF must bind (those) attributes to 




• High Robustness Requires
– PoLP
– Control of Dynamic Re-Configuration
• Common Criteria Version 3.0 transition
– Most SK requirements fit into existing families
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